Category Archives: ICC

The ICC should resist its "Boy Scout Mentality" in relation to Vatican "Crimes against Humanity" for child abuse

Posted on September 15, 2011 | Leave a comment

Cross posted on the Invisible College

Earlier this week, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) submitted, on behalf of the Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests, a communication  to the International Criminal Court requesting that an investigation be opened for Crimes against Humanity committed by high-level Vatican officials.
In a nutshell, the submission argues that there is evidence of widespread and systematic abuse (both rape and torture) of a civilian population by priests in a number of countries and that the Vatican, and more specifically Joseph Ratzinger, both in his former capacity as Prefect of the Congreation of the Doctrine of the Faith, and current capacity as Pope Benedict XVI, should be held liable for covering this up, even to the point of promoting it (this last point is a little ambiguous and I’ll return to it later).

This idea has been floating around for a while now. Geoffrey Robertson published a book last year arguing for such an approach. I remain skeptical however and think that there are a number of difficulties with the submission.

As a preliminary remark, one should remember that the Prosecutor is under no obligation to proceed from here, neither to open a preliminary examination, nor, of course, to open a formal investigation. The submission by the CCR does not “trigger” the jurisdiction of the ICC, as would a referral by a State Party of the Security Council, and the OTP is not even under an obligation to respond to the submission (although it claims that, for reasons of transparency, it generally will “aim” to respond to communications).

I would like to comment on three aspects: jurisdiction, the scope of the situation, and finally on whether the crime is actually constituted.

  • Jurisdiction

First of all, it should be pointed out that the Prosecutor, should it proceed with an investigation, would only be able to look into crimes that were committed after the entry into force of the Statute in July 2002. Moreover, he will only be able to look at alleged crimes that took place, either on the territory of a State Party or by a national of a State Party. In this sense, it explains why the Communication includes the United States and one alleged american perpetrator, to the extent that the crimes in the US could have been committed by nationals of State Parties and that the American Citizen might have committed crimes on the territory of State Parties.

  • The scope of the situation

Second of all, the submission raises the question of the scope of the “situation” that would be the object of an investigation. Traditionally, situations have been expected to be limited in some way, especially from a territorial perspective. Up to now, this has been the case for all the situations looked into by the Court. The CCR submission, if it was followed would therefore be a first in the history of the Court, by defining a situation through a unity of crimes and alleged perpetrators exclusively, rather than through a territorial criteria. It should be pointed out that this is an implicit consequence of the reasoning of the CCR, because they don’t actually explicitely deal with this issue. Three brief comments on this.
1) One should remember that the ICC Statute does not define what a situation is. Therefore, as I’ve discussed before in relation to the Libya Referral, any challenges to the scope of a situation faces this difficulty of having no statutory guidelines on which to base such a challenge. The case-law has suggested some limitations to the scope of a situation, but these are vague enough for anybody to argue that they could be extended to cover the events in the current submission.
2) It remains that there might be a difficulty with the submission when one considers not so much the concept of “situation” in general, but consider it in relation to the other ICC distinction, namely a “case”. Indeed, I might not be able to define a situation, but what the CCR is describing in its communication certainly appears to me to be a “case”: they identify a crime, the perpetrators and the mode of liabity. In this sense, the OTP, even should it accept a broader approach to a “situation”, would be in violation of the Statute and the rights of the defense should it define the situation in the terms used by the CCR.
3) Which leaves the question open of how this situation would be phrased. One option would be to open a distinct investigation into each of the countries named by the CCR, but in practice, it would still require that it be shown that the crime is constituted based on a transnational policy.

  • Is the alleged crime of “Crimes against Humanity” actually constituted? (and another rant on the confusion between HR and ICL…)

Which brings me to my third point : there is the major issue of whether Crimes against Humanity are indeed constituted. There is no doubt that the abuse in the catholic church has been widespread and systematic. Where the communication fails to convince, is on the organizational element required by the Elements of the Crimes in the following way:

“Attack directed against a civilian population”[…] is understood to mean a course of conduct […] pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack. […] It is understood that “policy to commit such attack” requires that the State or organization actively promote or encourage such an attack against a civilian population.

A footnote to this paragraph specifies that:

A policy which has a civilian population as the object of the attack would be implemented by State or organizational action. Such a policy may, in exceptional circumstances, be implemented by a deliberate failure to take action, which is consciously aimed at encouraging such attack. The existence of such a policy cannot be inferred solely from the absence of governmental or organizational action

How does this apply to the current situation? For one, no one seems to be arguing that the Vatican set up an actual policy to perpetrate widespread and systematic abuse against persons in the care of priests. It is their “deliberate failure to take action” which is put forward. However, even if the conduct of Church authorities is subject to criticism, I think it falls short of showing that it was “consciously aimed at encouraging such attack”. In this sense, when the communication says that the Vatican has been dealing with such situations in ways that ensured such violence would continue”, I think it still does not establish intent, even by omission.

In relation to this, the reasoning of the CCR is even more confusing as regards the modes of liability put forward. Indeed, the CCR is clearly confusing the constitutive elements of the crime and the modes of liability. Let me explain. The CCR considers three possible modes of liability: superior responsibility (Article 28), contribution (25(3)(d)) and aiding and abetting (25(3)(c)). All these modes of liability have in common to be “subsidiary” to the main crime, which still has to be constituted. But the CCR does not do that. It would have to show that independently of the Vatican, its officials are claimed to “only” be the accomplice, the priests that committed the abuse acted under a plan or policy that they had set up, which, again, is not argued here. Indeed, without an established Vatican policy there is nothing that links the individual cases of abuse in a sufficiently organisational way to constitute a crime against humanity.

The consequence of this is that the Vatican officials are either responsible for “direct” commission under 25(3)(a), or not responsible at all. But they cannot be held complicit for a crime that is not constituted independently  of them. Which leaves us with one, arguably progressive, but at least coherent way of putting the case forward. It is the systematic cover up of this widespread abuse that constitutes the crime against humanity, not the abuse itself. This would mirror the development under human rights law of positive obligations, whereby if the State does not prevent the violation of a right under the ECHR, for example, by a third party, it is held responsible for the violation of that right. This reasoning would at least solve the issue of the modes of liability and the constitution of the crime.

However, and regular readers of this blog won’t be surprised, I am not in favour of such an approach. This communication illustrates once again the slow (and apparently inevitable) blurring of the line between human rights and international criminal law. For me, widespread and systematic human rights violations do not necessarily constitute crimes under international law. These are related, but conceptually distinct domains that should remain distinct. In relation to this, it is unsurprising that the Communication relies heavily on the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber decision that authorized the opening of the investigation in the Kenya situation. I criticised it at the time, agreeing with the dissenting opinion of Judge Kaul, for broadening too much the scope of Crimes against Humanity. I expressed similar doubts in relation to the reference to Crimes against Humanity in the Libyan Arrest warrants. In a way, you can’t blame the CCR for its communication. It’s a direct consequence of all-encompassing conceptually blurred approach to crimes against humanity by the ICC judges themselves that is to blame. The conduct of the Church in past decades is certainly appalling, requires the utmost attention and should be dealt with accordingly, but, but I remain convinced that the ICC is not the right forum.

Hopefully, the Prosecutor and judges will not fall victim once again to the “boy scout mentality”, which leads them to systematically want to save the world with two twigs and a piece of rope, even if someone else might have a far better set of tools…

UPDATE: Of course, another angle to approach this is from a PR perspective. It is clearly the ambition of the CCR to get media attention over the issue. This plays into the general trend of trying to get the ICC involved in every situation, to get some news coverage. Indeed, no situation seems to escape this trend (Palestine, Syria, Tunisia…). As discussed above, I disagree with this conceptually, but I have to admit that it is certainly effective. Thanks Joe for pointing this out.

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Posted in Crimes against Humanity, ICC, Vatican

Khaddafi Arrest Warrant: Some Thoughts on the arrest "obligations" and Crimes against humanity as the new "crime of crimes"

Posted on June 1, 2011 | 1 comment
In my last post, I considered one of the political aspects of the indictment against Khaddafi in relation to the Peace vs. Justice debate.
Today, some quick thoughts on the legal dimension of the request for arrest warrants. The situation in Libya indeed raises a number of interesting issues which I am particularly fond of. I won’t delve  into the question of the actual legality of security council referrals. I’ve said in the past that I was skeptical about the mechanism as a whole, because i don’t believe the SC has the power to bind a state not party to a treaty to that treaty, and more particularly discussed the legality of Resolution 1973 here (don’t forget to read the comments section, it raises some quite interesting ideas on the extent of Security Council powers. 
I also will not insist on the issue of head of state immunity that is raised here, for the second time at the ICC after the Bashir case. Dapo Akande, over at EJIL Talk! argues that because SC resolution binds Libya to the Statute of the ICC, it must abide by article 27 which removes immunity. Needless to say, given my previous remarks, that I disagree with this analysis. At best, SC 1973 obliges Libya to cooperate with the Court, but within the limits of its international rights and is not bound by the actual content of the Statute.
  • Third State obligations in relation to arrest warrants

One notable point that comes up in relation to the request for the arrest warrants is what they would, if granted, require of other states. As I have argued before, I don’t believe that the issuance of an arrest warrant automatically creates an obligation for state parties to the ICC to arrest the person in the absence of a specific request under 89(1). Moreover, I have also argued that the general requests to all states under 89(1), irrespective of actual knowledge of the presence of the accused on the state’s territory, seemed contrary to the drafting of that article. This argument seemed to me like a shot in the dark, given the practice of the court in wholesale notifications… But apparently the ICC Prosecutor agrees with me (which also means that for once, I agree with the ICC Prosecutor…)! Indeed, in the request for arrest warrants, the Prosecutor points out in the request that : 

65. The Office submits that, if this Application is granted and the Court proceeds to issue warrants of arrest, the Court should exclusively transmit a request for the arrest of the suspects to Libyan authorities.
66. This would conform with the requirements of Article 89(1) which provides “The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person, together with the material supporting the request outlined in article 91, to any State on the territory of which that person may be found and shall request the cooperation of that State in the arrest and surrender of such a person”. Addressing a request at this stage to other States on whose territory, according to the information available, the suspects are not physically present would appear superfluous and contrary to the express scheme foreseen in Part 9. 

Dapo Akande finds this position strange, because it suggests that the approach adopted in the Bashir case was contrary to the statute. But I think that the Prosecutor is perfectly right in his reading of article 89(1) and that indeed, the previous practice of the court was contrary to the statute. Apparently, someone at the OTP is reading this blog and some credit would have been nice…
  • Crimes against Humanity as the new crime of choice?

A second notable point is the crimes for which the warrants are sought. The “Tripoli Three”, as Mark Kersten has aptly named them, would be charged, according to the request, for two counts of crimes against humanity. This raises a number of questions. The first one relates to the question of whether counts of war crimes could also have been possible (see Dapo Akande’s discussion of whether there was in fact an armed conflict in Libya at the relevant times for the acts under consideration). 
More generally, I think it shows a recent trend towards crimes against humanity becoming the new ideal crime of international justice. Indeed, it seemed that crimes against humanity had lost their appeal, more particularly in relation to genocide, as the debate surrounding the Bashir arrest warrant showed. But now, it is back in fashion, especially in the new context of wanting the ICC to deal with the “arab spring” and more generally with situations of internal crack down of political opposition. 
Indeed, Crimes against humanity have the benefit of not needing the special intent of genocide (and generally being more adequate for criminal law than genocide, as I’ve argued elsewhere). Moreover, they don’t require an armed conflict, which are usually hard to identify in the situations of popular uprising that we are witnessing now. 
Of course, there still remains the question of establishing the widespread and systematic nature of the attacks (with the corresponding knowledge), as required by article 7(1) of the Statute. But even this is turning out to be not so much of a problem if the threshold is lowered, as was the case in the Kenya situation, thus allowing for systematic human rights violations to be “caught” under the umbrella of crimes against humanity. I had strong doubts about the Pre-Trial Chamber’s approach back then, and still do, but if the trend is confirmed, then Crimes against Humanity have found a new youth and may even becoming the new “crime of crimes”.

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Posted in Crimes against Humanity, genocide, ICC, libya

Libya and the ICC: On the Legality of any Security Council Referral to the ICC

Posted on February 28, 2011 | 10 comments

The UN Security Council resolution on Libya has received a lot of exposure in the past few days. Most notable international law blogs have commented upon it. I more strongly recommend Xavier Rauscher’s posts over at the International Jurist (here and here), Kevin John Heller’s insights over at Opinio Juris, Marko Milanovic’s take at EJIL Talk! and William Schabas’ thoughts. Given this amount of analysis, I thought I would avoid blogging just to repeat what everyone had said.

but there is one issue that has not been discussed and that is the legality of the referral mechanism as a whole.

As the readers of this blog might know, I remain convinced that the power given to the Security Council, by a treaty other than the UN Charter to effectively make that treaty binding on a non-State party is contrary to international law. I discussed this issue before in relation to the Darfur referral (here and here). You could tell me that I should let bygones be bygones, that the system exists and that I should just live with it. But, I realized I couldn’t do so when reading the debate over at Opinio Juris on the “legality” of the following paragraph of the Resolution:

6. Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a State outside the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya established or authorized by the Council, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the State.

The debate turned around the question of whether this limitation was “lawful” or of “dubious legality” and “ultra vires”. And then I asked myself a very simple question? “ultra vires” and “unlawful” in relation to what law or power? It cannot be the ICC Statute, because the UN Security Council is not bound by the ICC Statute, it is only bound by its constitutive treaty, i.e. the UN Charter. And it cannot be the UN Charter, because there is famously no boundaries to the use of Chapter VII. So the UN Security Council can say what it wants and the whole debate actually shows the legal absurdity of the whole UNSC referral system.

Which brings me back to my initial point, the legality under international law of the mechanism as a whole. I cannot see in what reading of the general rules of the international law, the Security Council can be empowered to make a treaty binding on a State without its consent. Even more so if this power does not arise from the UN Charter itself.

If I do play along with the existing system for one minute, I still don’t see the problem with paragraph 6 from the ICC’s perspective. Kevin John Heller put forward a hypothetical scenario in this respect:

 What would happen in the following, obviously fanciful, scenario?  Gaddafi is toppled and turned over to the ICC, which initiates a prosecution against him. The SC authorizes a peacekeeping mission in Libya, and during the mission a US peacekeeper commits a war crime.  The ICC prosecutes him, concluding that paragraph 6 has no legal force. If the paragraph is not severable and the referral is void, what happens to the prosecution of Gaddafi?

But there are no formal requirements for the content of a referral in the Statute other than the fact that it must be done under Chapter VII. More generally, referrals, whether from States or the UNSC, are not “binding” and don’t have “legal force”. They can say what they want, and therefore no issues of “legality” actually arise. As long as a “situation” is referred, as defined by the Statute, it only triggers the Prosecutor to move along, and ultimately, his prosecutorial discretion will prevail and any case that arise will be evaluated within the ICC framework based on its jurisdictional criteria. The Prosecutor has said so much in his policy paper on preliminary examinations, where he points out, for example, that he is not bound by a list of possible indictees that a UN report or a truth commission will have set up, or limited to prosecuting one side of a conflict (although this is factually what he has done in Uganda, but that is a different issue). Bottom line, the ICC is not bound by any frivolous extra bits in a referral. Once a State or the UN Security Council has referred a situation, limiting prosecution to blonds with green glasses, or blue men from Mars is not unlawful. It’s just irrelevant.
To those who would argue that SC referrals are different that other referrals because they concern non-State parties to the ICC, I would answer that is exactly why you should have refrained from putting it in the Statute in the first place. Once it is in there, the same rules apply in my opinion.

UPDATE: I’ve continued debating this in the comments section of Opinio Juris, which compels me to make Three extra points here. 1) There is no statutory definition of a “situation” and the case law is quite vague on this issue, so I’m surprised at the over-reliance on this term in the analysis, when the term itself is so empty. 2) more generally, I insist that this is not an issue of legality, in the absence of any “legal nature” of the referral and conditions of its “legality”. Referrals are essentially political triggers that don’t need to conform to any legal guidelines and previous practice shows that. The Uganda referral mentioned a vaguely defined region (‘northen Uganda’) and limited the crimes to those committed by the LRA. 3) linked to the previous one, there are other ways of dealing with the issue that the “legality/illegality” approach. To take Kevin’s above quoted hypothetical, a Libyan defendant who would contest the referral would just receive the answer that he fits within the limits of the referral. It is only if a UN peacekeeper from the US (for example) is prosecuted that he might claim the protection of the resolution, with the Court considering that the paragraph is either “operable”n or “inoperable”.

In conclusion, save for contesting the mechanism as a whole, I think that there is nothing wrong with the SC referral as it stands.

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Posted in ICC, libya, referrals, Security Council

Miscellaneous ICC issues: a bit of a stretch…

Posted on December 7, 2010 | 3 comments

The ICC has been very visibly active in the past week on a variety of issues. Each one could warrant a separate post, but for lack of time, I thought I’d share some random thoughts in one post.

The first issue is the request for cooperation put to the Central African Republic last week in light of the planned visit of Omar Bashir to the country. I’ve blogged before on the question of whether States have an automatic obligation under the Statute to give effect to an arrest warrant. I believe that they don’t, and that there should be a specific additional request to give rise to such an obligation. In the comments to that post I also wondered whether the general request for cooperation to all State parties was in fact in conformity with the Statute:

I’d still have one question on the use of article 89 by the Court in this wholesale way. 89(1) mentions a possibility to issue a request to “any State on the territory of which that person may be found”, rather than just “any State”. If the second part of the sentence is to have any legal meaning, it can’t just be all the countries in the world preemptively… Shouldn’t there be some reasonable indication of the presence of the accused on the territory of a State as a condition of the issuance of the request?

This applies, in my opinion, to the specific request put to CAR. Indeed, I find that the decision is unclear as to what the exact legal basis for the request is. It refers to articles 86, 89 and 97, without specifying what specific provision it relies on to request cooperation from a State on whose territory a person might travel. But I suppose I’m just being picky here…

The second issue relates to the annoucement from the OTP that they have opened a preliminary investigation into North Korea. As reported by Xavier over at International Jurist, Professor Schabas, and Kevin John Heller, this raises interesting  questions both politically and legally. I would tend to agree with KJH that it seems like a very premature announcement, in light of how recent the events are. I also doubt that the gravity threshold would be met. In terms of PR, it also marks a recent trend by the OTP in communicating much more on his work compared to a few years ago. Indeed, it took some years before the public was made aware of the scope of preliminary investigations, and we only saw two letters (Irak and Venezuela) where the OTP actually explained how he conducted his work in this very grey area of the proceedings.

The last issue relates to Ivory Coast. Deputy-Prosecutor Bensouda asked “political leaders to call on their supporters and fellow citizens to show restraint and avoid unrest”. I find this statement ironic in its underlying assumption that the ICC can foster peace, given that Ivory Coast made a declaration under 12(3), recognising the Court’s jurisdiction in April 2003, following the very serious unrest that took place at the end of 2002, without the OTP doing anything (visible). I’m also not entirely convinced that, as a judicial body, it is the ICC’s role, and more particularly the OTP’s one, to make such warnings. But I suppose the proponents of “positive complementarity” would disagree with me…
A point of interest is that the communication by Bensouda assumes that the 12(3) declaration still stands today. It certainly seems the case when you read it (in French), because it does say that it is for an “open-ended period”. But I find the langage used ambiguous because it refers to the events of september 2002, rather than any crime committed on the territory from that date. But I suppose the interpretation can go both ways and that Ivory Coast should have done a better job on the drafting if it wanted to avoid any ambiguity.

A couple of concluding points on the general impression that transpires from the three issues I considered briefly. I have the impression that the ICC is in a PR frenzy where it might be biting off more that it can chew. The Court is already struggling to conclude its first trial and has only just started its second one [UPDATE: as pointed out by a careful reader, Bemba is actually the 3rd trial, not the second. I forgot about Katanga and Chui.]. With the institution failing in its judicial function, one has to wonder whether it is wise for it to multiply its interventions in the political area (Ivory Coast) and into bordeline cases such as the North Korean one. Maybe I am not ambitious enough for the Court, but I believe that it should be more cautious at this (still) early stage of its existence.

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Posted in bashir, ICC, ivory coast, north korea

Follow-up on Lubanga and the possible removal of ICC Prosecutor by the ASP: it’s "definitely" not going to happen, says the President of the ASP.

Posted on October 14, 2010 | 1 comment

I ended my previous post on the possible next steps after the Appeals Chamber Judgment reversing the stay of proceedings in the Lubanga case. I would like to make a couple of follow-up comments on this point.

For one, it is likely that contempt proceedings be initiated by the Court in accordance with article 71 of the Statute. In accordance to Rule 171 of the RPE, the Chamber can pronounce the removal from the proceedings of a person who has failed to comply with an order of the Court, or even, if the person is an official of the Court, order an interdiction to exercise their function for a period up to 30 days. And of course, they can fine the person as well.
I still don’t see how this is linked to the opportunity of staying the proceedings or not. If the prosecutor were being accused of bribing witnesses (which is not far removed from the underlying accusations against the OTP intermediaries in this case…), would the Chamber have an obligation to keep the trial going while it initiated proceedings under 71, even if it means that corrupt witnesses are testifying? It wouldn’t make sense. You have to make sure that the underlying cause justifying the stay has ceased to exist before you can resume the trial.

Another (independent) avenue is action by the ASP. This could lead to disciplinary measures (Article 47) which may be (very scary) “(a) A reprimand; or (b) A pecuniary sanction that may not exceed six months of the salary paid by the Court to the person concerned” (RPE, Rule 32). Or, if the conduct is sufficiently serious, the ASP can vote by an absolute majority of States a removal from office (Article 46). There is no middle-ground between the two, such as a temporary suspension. However, this oversight is partly compensated by the fact that the Chamber can suspend the person temporarily. It should also be pointed out that the proceedings are not initiated directly by the ASP, but should be triggered through a formal complaint to the Presidency, or proprio motu by the Presidency (Rule 26 RPE).

In relation to the latter possible proceedings at the ASP, the Asser Institute hosted a lecture by Ambassador Wenaweser last night, where the President of the ASP shared some of his thoughts on the Kampala Conference and more generally on what lies ahead for the ICC. In response to a comment he made on strenghtening the role of the ASP, I asked him if he had any thoughts on the ASP using its powers to sanction or even remove Prosecutor Ocampo. He was fairly evasive on the ASP looking into things more generally, but his answer was crystal clear on the removal aspect: this will definitely not happen. Of course, this is unsurprising politically. But this statement is problematic, both substantially and procedurally.

From a substantial point of view, you have to wonder what the Prosecutor must do to be removed, if his conduct in the Lubanga case is not sufficient to at least consider the possibility. In Lubanga alone, he has voluntarily misrepresented the Statute not to communicate UN documents to the defense. He has refused to obey Court orders. Also, we mustn’t forget the underlying situation behind the recent current events, which have taken a backseat to the procedural drama of the stay of proceedings : his intermediaries are alleged to have interfered with witnesses, which, if established, would be a massive breach of the fairness of the proceedings.

Beyond this substantial aspect, it is problematic that the President of the ASP would express a preconceived opinion about the possible outcome of a formal procedure provided for by the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. This is just as inappropriate as a judge saying in advance that a defendant will go free before his hypothetical trial takes place.

This is a sign of the general impunity for the organs of international tribunals, which is ironic given that their overarching mandate is specifically to fight impunity. Judges have been caught sleeping. Prosecutors have been accused of paying witnesses. Decisions have been taken that clearly undermine the rights of the defense on a daily basis, both subanstially (for example new crimes being added through the haphazard use of customary law) and procedurally (for example the very lax rules on the admission of evidence). All these events would constitute serious miscarriages of justice by any normal standard, but end up having little to no consequences in international tribunals under the guise of the superior moral objective of these institutions. Of course, I’m not equating some of the procedural improprieties that I mention previously, to the serious crimes alledgedly committed by the defendants. But the underlying principle behind these tribunals should apply in their daily working: if there is no accountability, there cannot be justice.

To come back to the specific issue at hand, one could argue that it wouldn’t look good and would be a sign of weakness for the ICC to remove (or sanction) its Prosecutor. But for me, this is a short-sighted analysis. On the long-run, the legitimacy of the Court will depend on its capacity to publicize its successes, but also to accept the consequences of its failures. It is a sign of the maturity of an institution that it can acknowledge its mistakes, rather than sweep them under the carpet, as it keeps doing in the Lubanga case. All they will achieve is to create this increasing mound of dust over which Justice, as the long-term goal of the institution, can only stumble eventually.

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Posted in ICC, lubanga