Category Archives: ICC

Palestine and the ICC (follow-up): asking the right question and giving the wrong answer

Following our (really long) online debate some months back (see here and here), Michael Kearney has published another opinion on the declaration of the PA under article 12(3) of the Rome Statute. It very clearly highlights the different approaches to Palestinian Statehood and argues (along with Alain Pellet, who issued his own opinion on this) that a functional approach should be adopted to allow the declaration of the PA under 12(3). The paper might be called “asking the right question”, but I fear once again that it’s not giving the right answers…
I won’t redo all the debate again, but I have two nagging questions that remain unanswered for me in this reasoning.

1) One argument is that the PA has criminal jurisdiction over the crimes, so it can transfer the jurisdiction. But how is material jurisdiction over the crimes relevant for 12(3)? This provision follows 12(2)  which provides that:

In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:

(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft;

(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.

 There is no mention of material jurisdiction here. It’s territory and nationality. Criminal jurisdiction over the crime is actually not a criteria under article 12 which is not a question of transfer of jurisdiction, but acceptance of jurisdiction in relation to territory and nationality. If not this would have two strange consequences 1) let’s imagine a State where a certain war crime was committed but where the prosecution of such a crime would not be possible under its national criminal code. It could still become a Party or make a 12(3) declaration. Making criminal jurisdiction an extra criteria under 12 would mean that the ICC could only prosecute crimes in States which have themselves provided for the prosecution of the crime. Hardly the will of the drafters… 2) at the other extreme, it would mean that any State having implemented universal jurisdiction could make a 12(3) declaration. Criminal jurisdiction is only relevant when it comes to complementarity and whoever claims that it is relevant for article 12 needs to show me through what magic the two criteria of 12(2) (territory and nationality) suddenly became three…

2) A simple question: would you agree that the phrasing of the provision which talks about a “State which is not a Party to this Statute”, implies that an entity that can make a declaration under 12(3) is also an entity that can actually sign the Rome Statute? I personally don’t see any other interpretation of 12(3), and in that case, it begs the further question: if you’re supporting the PA’s declaration, why not support its signature of the Statute? That would certainly send a strong message to the international community and force the ASP to come up with a clear answer as to what is a “State” for the meaning of the Rome Statute.

I look forward to some answers!

The Football World Cup and the ICC Bashir Arrest Warrant: what’s the link?

The last place where you would expect to read about the ICC would be in relation to football. However, according to news reports

South Africa invited Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir to the World Cup along with the rest of Africa’s leadership, but would arrest him should he take up the invitation, President Jacob Zuma said.
Bashir is wanted by the International Criminal Court on charges of war crimes. He rejected the charges of having ordered mass murder, rape and torture in western Darfur.
Zuma said in response to a question in Parliament that the country had a responsibility to arrest him should he accept the invitation and attend the June 11 opening ceremony.
“South Africa respects the international law and… we abide by the law,” he said.

Last week, a debate was sparked in some countries (Kenya for example) on attending his swearing-in ceremony (The US did send a junior diplomat, but claim it doesn’t mean anything). After last year’s AU declaration calling for not cooperating with the Court, these recent event show the actual ambiguity of African leadership towards the warrant. I wonder how long this will last. Not that I believe that all foreign policy should always be consistent, but inviting someone while telling him he’ll be arrested if he accepts is pushing diplomatic schizophrenia a little far…

Scoop: The ICC informs the Security Council of Sudan’s lack of Cooperation

Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a decision this week informing the Security Council on the lack of Cooperation from Sudan in the Harun and Ali Kushayb case. In itself, it’s not a surprising decision, given Sudan’s stated refusal to cooperate with the Court, although one can hardly imagine that the Security Council didn’t know already, given that the Prosecutor himself, in his yearly reports to the UNSC, has repeatedly complained of Sudan’s lack of cooperation.


The decision is however debatable in many ways. Others have already pointed out some of the problems. I agree with Professor Sluiter that it is problematic that Sudan wasn’t heard in the proceedings, which doesn’t give a very good image of the process, especially given the absence of a right of appeal. Also, the presentation of the reasoning is indeed quite enigmatic. But I do find the criticism of the “French style” of drafting a little unfair. The French, unfortunately, do not have the monopoly of poor and unclear reasoning, and it is possible to refer to countless “common law style” decisions that are equally enigmatic… I also agree with Professor Schabas in his criticism of the more than doubtful use of the concept of “inherent powers”, with the sole reference to Blaskic, given the ambition of the drafters to explicitly avoid this kind of reasoning.


In addition to the previous comments, I would like to add a few words on the main reason why this decision is so unsatisfactory, which brings us back, beyond the poor legal reasoning of judges, and as is often the case, to the poor drafting of the Statute itself.


Cooperation of States is generally covered by Article 87 of the Statute. It lays down the procedure to be followed by the Court in presenting requests for cooperation. However, it deals mostly with State parties. In this sense, the obligation to hear Sudan, if politically desirable, was not in fact a legal requirement under the Statute and Regulation 109 of the Court, as suggested by Professor Sluiter, because the latter regulation refers explicitly to Article 87(7), which applies to non-compliance by State parties only.


In relation to non-State parties, one has to look at article 87(5), which reads as follows:

(a) The Court may invite any State not party to this Statute to provide assistance under this Part on the basis of an ad hoc arrangement, an agreement with such State or any other appropriate basis.

(b) Where a State not party to this Statute, which has entered into an ad hoc arrangement or an agreement with the Court, fails to cooperate with requests pursuant to any such arrangement or agreement, the Court may so inform the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, the Security Council.

As we can see, it seems difficult to apply this provision to Sudan. For one, under sub-paragraph (a), given that Sudan has neither done an ad hoc arrangement or an agreement, the legal basis for a request for cooperation can only be the “any appropriate basis”, in which one could easily put the Security Council Chapter VII referral resolution which explicitly called on Sudan to cooperate with the Court. 
But what about the possibility under consideration here, that is to notify the Security Council of non-compliance? This is where the problem arises: subparagraph (b) only refers to this possibility for non-State Parties that have entered into an agreement with the Court, which is clearly not Sudan’s case. Which means that in fact a literal application of the Statute prevents the Court from notifying the Security Council of the non-cooperation of a non-State Party.
This is a terrible oversight in the drafting process. Once the drafters had allowed the Security Council to refer a situation in a non-State party, the logical consequence should have been to allow the Court to make a notification of non-compliance like with any other State and Article 87(5)(b) should have provided for that kind of event. The judges wouldn’t have had to resort to flimsy argumentation if the drafters had done their homework.


This being said, with this drafting anomaly in mind, the judges could have still done a better work. For example, if one accepts that a Security Council Resolution is an “appropriate basis” under 87(5)(a) and that 87(5)(b) is logically meant to apply to situations covered by 87(5)(a), then the theory of the useful effect (effet utile) could allow the judges to read the “appropriate basis” part in 87(5)(b) and therefore permit a notification to the Security Council. Of course, it’s not perfect, but it would at least give a statutory basis to the procedure, avoiding the more debatable reference to “inherent powers”.


Finally, this poses the question, once again, of the opportunity of the Security Council referral mechanism as it was set up, especially when it allows a situation in a non-State party to be brought before the Court. I’ve expressed my skepticism before on this issue, more particularly on the alleged power given to the Security Council to effectively make a State comply with the provisions of a treaty that it didn’t sign. You can call it my “French style” approach to international law, but this has always seemed to me to be contrary to basic principles of international law…

You read it first on Spreading the Jam: Garzon at the ICC

Well, he’s not exactly the new prosecutor yet, as I predicted some weeks back, but he is getting closer to an institution that fits better his “world approach” to justice. Garzon has asked to be transferred to the ICC for seven months as a “consultant” for Prosecutor Ocampo. Not only is it not necessarily a good idea for the ICC to hire such a polarizing figure, but more importantly, should the ICC really be hiring someone who is under 3 investigations for judicial misconduct in his home country? The charges might seem “political”, but to the last of my knowledge, Spain is a European democracy (with some problems, but still, don’t we all have them?), not some third world dictatorship. I’m a little puzzled at how easily the proceedings are being dismissed as “merely” political. It is the same judicial system that allowed Garzon to operate for so many years on his progressive approach to universal jurisdiction. Or maybe i’m just naive… In any case, I really don’t think it looks good for the ICC to take sides on this one (which it will clearly be doing, even indirectly, by letting Garzon work for it).

ICC and Kenya: questions of prosecutorial communication

I’ve posted an extensive legal comment on the Invisible Blog on last week’s decision at the ICC to allow the commencement of a formal investigation in Kenya. But important in these matters is also the question of communication and how the Court is perceived by various communities who have an interest in the functioning of the Court. As I mentioned in a previous post, I don’t believe that the Court focusing on Africa is a sign of its neo-colonialist nature. But the fact remains that perceptions, whether right or wrong, are fundamental, especially for an institution that relies so heavily on governmental and non-governmental cooperation for its daily operation.
In this context, it is interesting to look at the press conference held by the Prosecutor the day after the decision.  Mr. Ocampo has once again shown his capacity to express himself in a clear and synthetic way, with strong Orwellian statements aimed at striking our hearts and minds. Here’s one example:

The judges decided. There will be justice in Kenya. To contribute to the prevention of crimes during the next election we must proceed promptly. We will. There is a list of 20 suspects, but it is not binding. We envision at least two cases against one to three persons in each case. We will focus on those most responsible according to the evidence that will be impartially collected. We aim to finalize the bulk of the investigation during 2010. We will present our case before the Judges. They will decide. This is a judicial process.

On the content, there is nothing “decided” yet, the judges just allowed the commencement of a formal investigation. There have been no indictments, no arrest warrants or confirmation of charges and I would be surprised if anything notable happened in the next 18 months before the next election.

But for the purposes of this post, I’d like to focus on the form. It just seems incomprehensible that the Prosecutor of an international Court express himself in such a telegraphic fashion. Mr. Ocampo also appears in a video produced by the Hauser center where he reproduces exactly the same way of conveying ideas. And the example I give earlier does not show that he actually repeats some of sentences throughout the statement, to increase their impact…
I don’t know why he believes he should express himself like this. The statement seems to be perfectly tailored for an audience that seems to be perceived as incapable of comprehending sentences longer that 5 words (Human Rights activists and Africans?…). I’m a little reluctant to attribute such thoughts to Prosecutor Ocampo, but one can’t help feeling patronized when being spoken to like a child. And if it’s not based on what he perceives to be what people want to hear, I don’t really see any other explanation for such absence of effort in drafting a statement. Ok. We get it. Justice good. Criminals bad.

More importantly, this is not just an issue of the Prosecutor. He is also the most visible figure of the ICC. He represents the Court when he travels abroad or announces new investigations and cases. Critics of the ICC in past years invariably focus on the Prosecutor and I believe that the capacity of the Court depends, and will depend in the future on how the Prosecutor conveys his ideas to the communities whose help the ICC as a whole requires. Too often, Mr. Ocampo seems to act as a spokesperson of the Court and of the general “interests of justice”. That is not his function. He is a prosecutor whose role is to gather legal evidence of the commission of crimes and provide both incriminating and exonerating facts against a defendant. His statements, both in form and in content, go beyond this by portraying him as a avenger of wrongs, on a crusade against crime, which reflects badly on the ICC (see, among other examples, Ocampo’s recent “Bashir is Hitler” comment). Indeed, the ICC is but one institution in the general international framework for the advancement of international peace and security, and Mr Ocampo is but one keg of this institution. A perception of arrogance (whether real or not is not the question) on the part of the most public figure of the ICC can only be a hindrance for its ultimate success.