Category Archives: ICC

Q&A on the ICC and Africa: is the criticism on the legitimacy of the Court legitimate? Part 2

Question 4: The increased dissatisfaction with the ICC from the African Union seems to be based largely on the al-Bashir indictment (please correct me if you think I’m wrong). Some ICC advocates might say that this is merely a sign of African despots guarding their future impunity, and thus, the AU criticism actually shows that the ICC is heading in the right direction – that is, going after ‘the big fish’. Do you agree with this? Also, should one differentiate between support from African leaders and support from the civil society in this regard, or do you think that disappointment with the ICC is widespread in Africa?
I think I’ve broadly answered this question within my previous answers. You are right in considering that the dissatisfaction with the ICC in Africa is largely due to the Bashir arrest warrant which has made other African leaders a little weary of ICC intervention in their affairs, without their consent. As for this meaning that the ICC is going in the right direction, I told you before how skeptical I am of the “big fish” approach, despite its apparent appeal. If you really want my opinion on Darfur, I have exposed part of it in an opinion on the Hague Justice Portal, where I comment on the recent Bashir decision. I actually have my doubts, both in international law and from a policy point of view, of the Prosecutor over-insistence on the genocide charge and his reading of the political situation in Darfur. But should the prosecutor have to “read” political situations? I put some general remarks on this at the end of question 5.
On the complexity of African support for the ICC, I mentioned previously the variety of actors involved who will all have different reasons to be dissatisfied or satisfied with the court, so I think you have a good intuition in asking this question.
Question 5: What could the ICC do to regain some of the legitimacy that it appears to have lost in Africa? (Someone has suggested that the court should expand its focus beyond Africa – might this be helpful?)
Again, I have already started to answer your question in my previous answers. Legitimacy is not this monolithic object that an institution possesses or doesn’t possess. The question makes no sense as a general question. The answer depends on who you are trying to be legitimate to. For a lot of Human Rights activists, the question of Africa is irrelevant. What constitutes the legitimacy of the court is whether it is prosecuting the crimes that these activists consider as important, be that child soldiers, or forced marriage. The same is true for victims of crimes. Generally, the Court will always be “legitimate” to some and “illegitimate” to others, depending on each person’s or group’s agenda.
Linked to “legitimacy” is the question of expectations. Depending on your expectations, your disappointment will be more or less strong. And I think this is the real question that runs through all your other questions. What are the expectations of the court, and are those expectations legitimate? In my opinion, in my cases they are actually not, and this is where perception problems arise. Indeed, fundamentally, this is a Criminal Court, not an actor in peace negotiations, not primarily a “reconciler” or a granter of reparations to victims. Of course, I’m not naïve, politics are everywhere. But it is totally different to acknowledge that the ICC is one actor in a complex international political scene, and another to want to “import” international politics within the workings of the court. For example, is it really the role of the court to prosecute both sides to a conflict? I’m not sure. More broadly, should the situations investigated be equally distributed across the globe? Again, I don’t think so. Defenders of the ICC have created in my opinion too many and too high expectations of what the court is and what is should and can do, and for me this, correcting these incorrect perceptions  is the first place to start before dealing with the actual question of legitimacy.
Of course, moving back to more pragmatic considerations, and I’m sorry if my previous remarks are too theoretical for the purposes of your article, if the ICC does move to other parts of the world, it will obviously help its case in relation to this criticism. And as I mentioned before, this could happen both in Columbia and in Gaza. But one musn’t forget one important thing: the prosecutor is dependent on the fact that States must have signed and ratified the Statute. And the fact remains that the African continent contains, after Europe, the biggest number of State parties, and there are indeed a lot of crimes being committed there that are within the jurisdiction of the court. Other situations in the world would require a Security Council referral, but this is beyond prosecutorial policy and the power of the ICC as an institution. It is not really fair that the ICC should receive the criticism that should be aimed in fact the at the Security Council.
Question 6: The question of crimes of aggression is up for debate later this year. According to the Daily Telegraph, there has been talk in Britain about whether an agreement upon this crime opens the possibility of an indictment of Tony Blair. I know it is probably unlikely that an agreement would have retroactive effects, but even leaving that aside, is it not unrealistic that we will ever see Western leaders appear before the ICC (perhaps this also goes for Western soldiers, given the OTP’s refusal to go after British soldiers in Iraq)? If so, does this make the ICC vulnerable to charges of a ‘Western bias’?
In relation to aggression, you are right to point out that even  if there is an agreement on the definition at the Review Conference in Kampala later this year, it will in any case not apply retroactively.
As for the likelihood of seeing western leaders and soldiers being prosecuted at the ICC, you are probably right. But again, I’m not convinced about the “western bias” argument. The Iraq situation is quite specific, and there is no doubt (in my opinion) that the invasion of the country by the US and UK is an aggression under international law, and that specific war crimes have been committed. But most situations where western soldiers are involved are less ambiguous humanitarian or UN operations. There are often isolated cases of war crimes, but rarely the widespread situations of crimes that we all expect the ICC to deal with. Calling the fact that the ICC will more likely prosecute a perpetrator of crimes against humanity in Africa rather than a western soldier who committed a rape a “western bias” is just misplaced political correctness. Moreover, soldiers of western states are more likely to be prosecuted nationally, thus triggering the principle of complementarity. But it is totally disingenuine to use legitimate outrage about Irak to generalize on “western bias”. The fact is that in most cases, the widespread and systematic crimes that affect world peace will not be committed by western leaders and western soldiers.
Again, there is the specific situation of Irak and you mention the Prosecutor refusing to prosecute british soldiers. But this decision does make sense in the context of the ICC. For one, for reasons of jurisdiction, the prosecutor could not look at aggression. Second of all, he could only look at nationals of State parties, given that Irak is not a State party. With this in mind, the prosecutor did acknowledge that there was evidence of some cases of war crimes from british soldiers (based also on evidence provided by the British MoD), but that there was no evidence of a widespread commission of them by british soldiers and therefore decided not to pursue the investigation. Beyond the general issues with Irak, would it really be understandable that so much money be spent to prosecute these crimes (however reprehensible they are) when other situations legitimately deserve more attention, particularly applying the big fish theory? 

Q&A on the ICC and Africa: is the criticism on the legitimacy of the Court legitimate? Part 1

I gave a lecture last night at the Grotius Center on the Lebanese Special Court (more on this some other time) where my blog was mentioned as being updated at least weekly! So I have no other choice than to make this a reality…
I wanted to share with you an email Q&A session I did with a researcher in ICL on the relationship between the ICC and Africa. There were 6 questions, so I’ll post 3 today and 3 later. Please comment at will!

Question 1: There seems to be an increasing agreement among scholars that the ICC has an ‘image problem’ on its hands when it comes to its involvement in African states. Obviously, the crudest critique that has been leveled at the Court and the Office of the Prosecutor is that it’s a neo-colonialist institution. In your opinion, does the ICC’s troubles with African nations (i.e., what seems to be a growing distrust from the African Union) amount to a mere ‘publicity’ issue, or do they have a basis in the actions and rationales of the ICC?
In relation to the « image perception » of the ICC in Africa, I think it is only partly grounded in reality. Indeed, when the ICC is accused of investigating crimes only in african countries, one musn’t forget that all, but for Darfur, are self-referrals. So it is a little disingenuine for African leaders to turn around some years later and claim that this is not what they wanted. Moreover, statistically, it’s hard to ignore the fact that Africa does host some of the most violent and active civil wars in the world, with regional dimensions that are quite important.
The Darfur case is very different because it is a Security Council referral imposed on a country without its consent. There are actually quite strong arguments in international law against this procedure, which is suprisingly little discussed in academic littérature, but I don’t think that’s the focus of your article. Politically, I really do believe that this is where the disatisfaction takes a new turn, because it seems like a unilateral imposition of international will, in a sort of « neo-colonialist » way, as you pointed out. Before that, the main point of contention in Africa had been in Uganda, where it was considered that the ICC was hindering peace. But it hadn’t led to such large-scale disatisfaction.
Another point, which is in relation to another one of your question, is that there is not one « african public opinion ».  African leaders will try and protect themselves, so will be weary of an active ICC. But there are other sources of disatisfaction. For many human rights activists, it is inaction in many situations which is considered a problem. The same is true of victim right’s advocates who consider that the reparation mechanisms and protection of victims and witnesses are insufficient. And even among the « justice » community, you will find disagreements, between the tenants of international prosecutions through the ICC, and the defenders of more flexible methods of transitional justice, such as traditional mechanisms (gacaca in Rwanda) or truth commissions.
It is therefore very difficult to « map » a unidimensional « african opinion » on the ICC. And although I’ve voiced my concerns and criticism about the ICC, especially the prosecutor, time and again, I don’t really buy this « anti-african » criticism.
Question 2: Critics of the ICC have claimed that the OTP has been politically pragmatic or even opportunistic in its choice of cases, going after rebel groups in Uganda, Congo and CAR while leaving alone government leaders – possibly due to the OTP’s dependency of state corporation during investigations, possibly because of their status as Western allies. In your opinion, are these allegations well-founded?
The cases being investigated do seem to confirm the allegation. The most clear-cut case is Uganda, where the direct rebels are being prosecuted. In CAR, the OTP even manages to indict the main political oponent of the DRC President ! in DRC, this is also largely true, even if the position of the rebel leaders vis-à-vis the governement has been more fluctuating in recent years.
The real question is whether the OTP can realistically act differently ? I don’t think that Ocampo is pandering to western interests. It is a real pragmatic position of needing the cooperation of the States in the investigation of the crimes. I believe it was necessary to proceed in this way in the early life of the ICC. What kind of criticism would the prosecutor have heard had he chosen cases impossible to investigate and prosecute? In this sense, there does seem to be an evolution in the approach of the prosecutor. In other situations he is now looking at, most notably Kenya, but also Colombia and hypothetically Gaza, the focus is on “both sides” of the conflict, therefore including the government.
Question 3: In the same vein: does the OTP run the risk of becoming a tool for the governments that have made self-referrals? One person I interviewed considered this a very real risk, and said that the ICC will only have reached a sufficient level of maturity once the OTP starts going after ‘the big fish’ (government officials etc.) like del Ponte did at the ICTY – regardless of whether these leaders are supported by the west (as Museveni, for instance, has been). Do you agree with this?
Which leads to question 3, as you rightly put it. Which is in fact two questions.
The first one relates to  self-referrals. As you know, it was not at all considered as an option or discussed during the negotiations of the Statute before and in Rome. You are right to point out that a self-referral will always carry a risk of political manipulation of the ICC by the government. When the ICC prosecutor announced the investigation in Uganda in a press conference with Museveni, it obviously sent a such a message.
However, I’m not sure that the situation is as “bad’ as described by some. In Uganda, even if the OTP has not opened any cases concerning government officials, it has been very clear in not giving in to Museveni in relation to dropping the arrest warrants in the context of the peace negotiations. More generally, as I pointed out earlier, I don’t think it was necessarily a bad strategy initially, when the court was looking for its first cases. I think that today, the OTP seems to be leaning towards more autonomy.
The second part of your question relates to case-specific prosecutorial strategy. The “big fish”/”small fish” debate has been going on as long as there have been international tribunals. The first ICTY case, Tadic, was a typical situation where the tribunal went for whatever it could get. There is no doubt that if Tadic had been arrested 10 years later, he would have been transferred for trial in a national court. 
Is the same true for the ICC? I’m not too sure, because, to say the least, the strategy of the prosecutor seems a little obscure sometimes. Of course, he didn’t open an investigation against Museveni, but he did indict the top leaders of the LRA. In CAR, Bemba is clearly a “big fish”. And the same is true in Darfur, with the indictment of Bashir. As for DRC, the policy seems to be “crime specific” rather than “person specific”. The prosecutor seems to have chosen a crime, child soldiers, and then chosen an alleged perpetrator (although he has slowly evolved towards a focus on sexual violence, which has created so many problems in the Lubanga trial, as you probably know). The same is partly true in CAR, where is a strong insistence on rape.
Personally, I must admit that I don’t have a fixed opinion on the “perfect” prosecutorial strategy.
The “big fish” theory is very popular, but I’m not sure how effective it actually is. For one, one has to wonder towards whom the court is trying to be “legitimate”. The arrest and trial of Milosevic and now Karadzic have done nothing to increase positive responses towards the ICTY in Serbia. And if any reconciliation is to happen, it will have to include the Serb population.  Linked to this is the relative notion of “big fish”. For example there is a lot of talk about Mladic not being arrested yet, while the international press never mentions that his superior is currently on trial (I’m sorry, I don’t recall his name right now… which kind of proves my point I suppose…).  Second of all, is it so illegitimate for the Prosecutor to focus on the crimes, which are labeled as the worst, rather than picking and choosing the perpetrators, which will also always be a political decision?

Abu Garda: Justice follows its course

Given my recent travels, I didn’t have time to comment on the decision by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I not to confirm the charges against Abu Garda.

It’s a fairly momentous decision from a symbolic point of view. It crowns a series of debatable decisions on the part of the prosecutor in the most emphatic way. This prosecutor really seems to make everybody unhappy. In relation to my previous post on the ISA conference, it was funny to see that despite all the inter-disciplinary disagreements on matters relating to the International Criminal Court, everybody seems to agree to criticize Ocampo… Beyond that, I think it is in fact a good thing for the legitimacy of the Court that it accepts to not go to trial. I don’t recall this happening before in international justice. Arguably, the ICC did so on a fairly low profile case, where no media-friendly crime is involved, but still…

From a legal point of view, the decision is not that surprising when you read through it. The OTP really seems to have butchered the case. Apparently, the Prosecution cannot persuasively show that Abu Garda participated in any of the meetings where the attack was planned, nor can it establish that he actually physically took part in the attack. Apparently, the OTP documents claim that he was there and not there… So given this lack of evidence, at least that’s how the PTC presents it, it only seems normal that the confirmation of charges was denied.

This being said, I had a couple of extra comments. The first one relates to the nature of the confirmation of charges decision. The Chamber reminds us “that the confirmation hearing is neither a trial before the trial nor a mini-trial”. But it is difficult to see how it is not. PTC I seems to engage in the sort of activity that is typical of a trial phase. More particularly, it systematically does an assessment of the credibility of witnesses in comparison with other witnesses. It also engages into a very precise legal analysis of the definition of the crime and its application to the specific AMIS mission, which turns out to be useless at the end given that they can’t link Abu Garda to the events anyway (Judge Tarfusser gave a separate opinion on this point). As I’ve already said elsewhere, the multiplication of procedural steps at the ICC and the correlative multiplication of burdens of proofs makes the whole process a little confusing in my opinion, and the only benefit initially proposed for this, namely speeding things up, has noticeably failed until now. So I remain skeptical about the ICC pre-trial mechanisms.

The second point relates to gravity, something I’ve already mentioned on this blog before. Up to now, the case-law seemed to have developed in the direction of the judges choosing to ignore the issue of the article 17 “sufficient gravity” criteria. In this case, PTC I did decide to consider it. It acknowledges that

“the gravity threshold contemplated therein is in addition to the Statute drafters’ careful selection of the crimes included in articles 6 to 8 of the Statute. Hence, the fact that a case addresses one of the most serious crimes for the international community as a whole is not sufficient for it to be admissible before the Court”. 

That is a first good first step if the gravity threshold is going to make any sense at all. But afterwards the reasoning loses of its credibility. The Chamber considers the elements to be taken into account, and refers to the criteria to be looked at at sentencing as a guideline. That doesn’t really make sense because it suggests that the crimes that would be considered of sufficient gravity at the admissibility phase are the ones that would carry heavier sentences due to aggravating circumstances later on. But if only those cases are selected at the outset, the sentencing criteria become redundant when sentencing comes along.
On their factual analysis, the judges are even more unconvincing.

“The Chamber thus finds that the consequences of the attack were grave for the direct victims of the attack, that is, the AMIS personnel, and for their families. In addition; the alleged initial suspension and ultimate reduction of’AMIS activities in the area as a result of the attack had a grave impact on the local population”

“The consequences were grave for the direct victims”! How’s that for an analysis? Of course the consequences were “grave”, the victims died! But the Chamber can’t really be saying that this is the threshold of gravity to be met, it would just strip it of its content once again. The consequences are always grave for the direct victims of crimes, whether it is genocide, rape or carjacking… as for the second criteria, I’m not convinced about the causality link. The ultimate reduction of AMIS activities in the region is a shameful strategic decision in response to the attack. But what did they expect? It is a war zone and risk is part of the job description. The reason there is a need for peacekeepers in the first place is because it is a risk zone…
I think this decision was the perfect opportunity for the judges to take a stand on the gravity threshold and make a policy statement that the OTP is apparently incapable of making that this kind of war crime, committed in isolation, is not a priority for an international court with a global dimension and limited means. And the opportunity was missed.

of Zeitgeist and Law: The ICC Bashir Decision as an excuse to actually rant about Genocide…

Yesterday, the ICC Appeals Chamber issued its long-awaited Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against Pre-Trial Chamber I’s refusal to allow the arrest warrant issued against President Bashir to cover Genocide charges. According to the Appelate judges, PTC I mis-applied the standard of proof at this stage of the proceedings by requiring that the genocidal intent be the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. The key argumentation by the Appeals Chamber is paragraph 33 where it states that:

“In the view of the Appeals Chamber, requiring that the existence of genocidal intent must be the only reasonable conclusion amounts to requiring the Prosecutor to disprove any other reasonable conclusions and to eliminate any reasonable doubt. If the only reasonable conclusion based on the evidence is the existence of genocidal intent, then it cannot be said that such a finding establishes merely “reasonable grounds to believe”. Rather, it establishes genocidal intent “beyond reasonable doubt”.”

Given this erroneous application of the standard of proof, the Chamber remands the matter to PTC I for a new decision, applying the right standard.

This case has created a lot of heated debate because it slots into a general debate about Genocide in Darfur. Scholars, practictioners, politicians have all contributed to the international cacophony surrounding this issue and it seems increasingly complicated to have any kind of clear discussion on the various components of the situation, given the array of political, moral and legal dimensions involved.

First things first, let’s start with the decision itself. The Judgment does not express an opinion on the substance of the evidence, and does not re-include genocide in the charges at this point. It merely considers the legal question of the correct standard of proof. And I find the argumentation quite convincing. PTC I had indeed, in my opinion, imposed too high a threshold on the Prosecutor for the issuance of an arrest warrant, which is a considerably early stage of the proceedings. Taken from a purely legal perspective, there is therefore nothing shocking about the decision.
Expanding our analysis to the general ICC framework, I agree with Professor Schabas that the Appeals Chamber is decidedly slow in its decision-making. I would also like to add that I am sometimes a little puzzled by its methodology. It often seems to be doing half the work, although not so much in this case, even if it could have been a little clearer on the actual content of the test to be applied by the Pre-Trial Chamber to establish the “reasonable grounds to believe”. One can recall its complete destruction of the gravity test proposed by the Pre-Trial Chamber in the early Lubanga/Ntaganda arrest warrant decisions, without giving any hint about what the appropriate test might be, with the consequence that the Article 17 gravity threshold has been completely stripped of any content, and has not been used by judges since.
However, I disagree that the issue should have been dropped at this stage, because the Prosecutor could have always added the charge later on in the proceedings in the event of Bashir’s arrest, as suggested by Alex De Waal, or because judges would have discretion to add a conviction for Genocide at the conclusion of the trial, evidence was brought forward to prove it, as suggested by Professor Schabas. Independently from the merits of the case, the Appeals Chamber pronounced itself on the applicable burden of proof under Article 58(1) of the ICC Statute which will hold for all cases at the ICC, not just the Bashir case. Also, I’m not sure about the possibility for judges at trial to add new charges, or convict someone for crimes that were not accepted at the confirmation of charges phase.
On the procedural aspect of the case, it does seem that the ICC framework, initially built to speed things up, is actually revealing itself to be extremely cumbersome. By multiplying the phases (pre-investigative, pre-trial, confirmation of charge, trial…) and the institutions (pre-trial chamber, trial chamber…) the drafters have multiplied the procedural hurdles and the risks of the whole process being bogged down. This is made more acute with the inclusion of victim participation with an increase in litigation to establish the exact nature of their contribution to the proceedings, although it can be expected that the case-law will settle at some point and the wheel won’t need to be reinvented every time a new case starts.

Finally, because a post of mine with no rant would not really be complete, I’d like to say a word about a word which for me is polluting discussions on Sudan: genocide. And this simple (ah ah) question: why is it so important to label as “genocide” what is happening in Darfur? There are several ways to approach the issue. From a legal perspective, there are various crimes under international criminal law and, whatever the proximity between them, more specifically in our case between genocide and crimes against humanity, it is only normal that the institutions dealing with these crimes call the actions by their right names. But the debate doesn’t stop here, of course. There is a moral stigma attached to genocide, which, for various reasons, is not attached to crimes against humanity. Why is that so? Kevin John Heller argues that:

“First, it is difficult to seriously maintain that there is no difference between charging someone with crimes against humanity and genocide.  There may be no difference in terms of the maximum  possible sentence, but it clear that genocide is viewed as far more serious than even the crime against humanity of extermination.  That’s why Raphael Lemkin coined the term “genocide.”  That’s why we have a Genocide Convention.  That’s why activists and scholars and governments put so much energy into ensuring that various situations — Saddam’s gassing of the Kurds, the Khmer Rouge’s “auto-genocide,” China’s treatment of Tibet, Australia’s treatment of aboriginals, etc. — are (or are not) labeled genocide instead of “mere” crimes against humanity.”

This is beside the point. For one, KJH is mixing two aspects of the question, that the crimes are different and that there is a hierarchy between the crimes. Of course the crimes have different elements. The question is why there is a hierarchy? And this is the second problem I have with KJH’s argumentation. He basically says that there is a hierarchy, because people think there is. That is not an answer. That a word enters the zeitgest for various socio-politico-moral reasons is not a objective explanation of why this is so. It’s like child soldiers which was the talk of the day for a while, now being replaced by forced marriage. The fact that the focus of activists and world opinion is on one of them rather than the other does not mean that there is an objective reason to have a hierarchy between the two. The same is generally true about any topic taken over by world opinion, whether a particular illness (why so much more money given for Aids than malaria, despite the heavier yearly death toll for the second?) or event (two similar natural catastrophes will often get varying media attention for no objective reason). As academics, we have to see beyond “world opinion” to look for reasons to explain how things are. Not doing so, is either naive or unprofessional.

Which brings me to my last comments. I personnally have always been weary of the crime of genocide. For one, in response to the hierarchy, I’m not convinced. I don’t see how it is worse to kill 1 million people indiscriminately (litterally denying them their humanity) or 1 million people because they are from a particular ethnic group. Who are we to judge on the loss of “diversity” that results from that? There is an unquestioned bias that is it worse to target a group, rather than individuals. I’ve never actually been convinced that my intent to kill is worse if I don’t like the person for a specific reason rather than no reason at all. I’d actually think that from a philosophical point of view, crimes against humanity would be more an affront to the rational cartesian mind because there would be no reason for the killing (i’m speaking in theory of course), whereas a genocide, however abhorrent, has some rationality behind it.
In fact, I think that what KJH and others are doing is mixing up sociology, which is essentially descriptive, and law, which is goal-oriented towards normativity, being the process through which moral conviction becomes obligatory conduct for all. For me, genocide needs a specific existence as a methodological tool to describe a social conduct and social reality that are different than other ones. It’s descriptive. Without the concept of genocide, you can’t understand the socio-historical aspects of some of the most brutal mass killings in history.
But should it be law, especially criminal law? The shock of the Shoah led world leaders to recognise the specificity of genocide. Their outrage was of course legitimate, but it maybe led them to adopting solutions the flaws of which are still burdening us today and are unlikely to disappear given the difficulty in changing such morally grounded opinions. But, I would nonetheless argue that genocide has, on balance, in fact very little place as a crime carrying individual criminal responsibility. For me, motive, as opposed to intent, is irrelevant for the purposes of criminal liability. It’s the same if I kill someone because he’s black, wearing green trousers, or just because I was in a bad mood. at best, it can come into play as aggravating circumstances, but not an element of the crime. More importantly, we are trying to “fit” what is fundamentally a collective socio-political endeavour into the criminal liability of one man.
It is bound to make everybody unsatisfied. Lawyers might feel that it is contrary to the rights of the defense, anthropologists suggest that the actual definition doesn’t take into account the social reality of genocide, activists try to “fit” situations in the definition of genocide to push for international intervention. But we all have to stop trying to fit everything into one accepted definition of the word. To anthropologists and sociologists, I would suggest that a criminal trial is never going to cover the social reality surrounding a genocide. It’s not its role, in the same way that a national criminal judge is not there to assess the 40 years of neglect from the State that created the context for this particular young individual from a difficult neighborhood to push the old lady under a bus. To Human Rights activists I would suggest that they are unnecessarily making their work harder by trying to apply  to collective situations of mass atrocities a definition that 1) is made for individuals and 2) the purpose of which is to be applied ex post facto in a court of law.
Of course, my solution to just scrap genocide as an international individual crime is totally unrealistic, but in the meantime I would suggest that the specifically criminal law aspect of genocide be kept to a minimum. And that sociologists, historians, activists, politicians stop locking themselves up in the legal debate and adopt the definition that fits their disciplines. Why is it so hard to accept that genocide can mean different things depending on the context? It is the case for so many words (causation, rationality, intent… all those words will have different meaning when you consider them in law or philosophy for example), why do we allow the debate on genocide to get floored by this illusionary search for a single cross-disciplinary definition?

Of Legal Reasoning and Wishful Thinking: The ICC and Gaza

In December, a well established Palestinian Human Rights organisation issued a Position Paper on whether the ICC should recognise the Palestinian’s Authority’s submission of a declaration to the OTP under article 12(3) of the Statute. For memory, this article provides that:

“If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception in accordance with Part 9.”

 The position paper argues that one should not adopt the general international law definition of statehood, and that in line with the “spirit” of the Statute, the question should be whether the PA has a jurisdictional authority over the crimes and can therefore transfer this authority to the ICC. The answer is positive (unsuprisingly… and I say that not because I doubt the intellectual honesty of the drafters of the policy paper, but because I doubt they would have published the paper had the conclusion be otherwise…).
I find the argumentation pretty smart, but ultimately flawed and unconvincing. Here are a few issues I have with the policy paper.

The question of a different definition of “State” in 12(3)
Here for me lies the biggest flaw in the argumentation. The policy paper refers, among other things to the fact that the Security Council can refer a “situation” to the ICC, as in the Darfur case, that doesn’t cover a State as defined in international law and therefore that it has some flexibility to circumscribe the investigation of the ICC . That is true… but irrelevant. As we say in French, “comparaision n’est pas raison”. There is no link between the definition of a “situation” in the Rome Statute and the definition of “State” in article 12(3). Indeed, the Security Council could very well refer, for example, the situation in the western provinces of China and the repression of the ouigours and that would not mean that the Xingjian region would itself be recognise as being able to make a declaration under 12(3). These are two different legal issues altogether.
More importantly, 12(3) refers to a “State which is not a Party to the Statute”. The Statute itself therefore considers that a “State” is an entity capable of joining the ICC Statute. In order for the PA to use 12(3), it must be established that it has the capacity to join the Rome Statute and is therefore a State itself, under general international law, which the Policy Paper itself recognized as difficult to establish under current international circumstances. I have difficulty in interpreting 12(3) differently against its wording.

The limits of “the object and purpose” approach to treaty interpretation
One paragraph(paragraph 20) of the Paper is particularly troubling and I quote it in full to be accurate:

“The Court has not been long in existence but it is clear from the cited examples that past precedent suggests a tendency to interpret the mechanisms of the Rome Statute expansively, while respectful of the rule of law, and in a manner which prefers fulfilment of the aims of the Statute over a narrow and unduly legalistic reading of international criminal law. It would be contrary to the purposes set forth in the Statute’s Preamble to exclude from the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction a geographical zone in which war crimes and crimes against humanity are perpetrated, on the sole premise that it is not generally recognized either as constituting a state, or a part of any state. Given the Preamble’s affirmation “that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation” and its determination “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes”, it is not unreasonable, indeed, it must be expected, that in interpreting the meaning of ‘state’ for the purposes of Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, an expansive approach, divorced from the political considerations which otherwise tend to guide state recognition, and rooted firmly in the principles and purposes of the UN Charter, must be followed.” (my emphasis)

This shows a tendency in a lot of Human Rights activists of interpreting broadly international instruments. It is at the basis for a lot of the case law of the ad hoc tribunals and at the ECHR. Taking the high moral ground allows people who have a more traditional approach to treaty interpretation to be labelled “ennemies of the cause”. If I don’t accept a HR-friendly expanding of a legal text to cover more situations than initially envisioned, it shows that I’m against HR. That is a dangerous route and plays with the limits of law and morals. It is one thing to recognize the atrocious nature of certain human conducts, it is another to go beyond the law to apply directly a moral rule. As a lawyer, I cannot agree with this “common sense” approach which basically renders the rule of law meaningless.
The “on the sole premise” comment I put in bold above shows the way things are considered. We appear as petty lawyer technocrats who can’t see the bigger moral picture. But it is not “on the sole premise”! It is the application of the Statute, a document negotiated, drafted and entered into force based on that drafting. If we follow the “common sense” approach, we might as well give up any rules of international law and at the least any certainty in its application. Who is to decide what is best for whom? I think it is the advocates of this approach who fail the see the bigger picture: that in most cases (with the adequate checks and balances of course) the rule of law implies the mediation of process in the establishment and change of rules in order to avoid arbitrariness. You can’t just change the rules just because you think its right or wrong. I perfectly recognise the inadequacies in the international lawmaking process, which is pervaded by selfish State interests. But I don’t think that the solution, on the long run, is to bypass the legal process entirely, even if it offers a short-term solution to a apparent loophole.
As for the “political neutrality” called for by the Paper, it is very nice, but totally unconvincing. Human Rights often cloud themselves in the shroud of universal morals detached from politics. But everything is political, in the strongest sense of the term. Societies make choices in governance. Nothing is imposed from above. Al Haq should recognise that it has a political agenda, and there is no shame in that. Like I said before, I doubt they would have published a policy paper saying that the PA was not able to make a declaration and that is perfectly understandable. But let’s not pretend to live in an apolitical utopia of HR and goodwill to all men. This is not the nature of men, and more importantly, clouds issues that are key in understanding the world. But i’ve gone off on a little of a tangent here… back to the issue…

Other relevant criteria
Having interpreted 12(3) as it did, the Policy Paper moves on to answer three questions as posed by the OTP to decide whether to accept the declaration under 12(3). In this sense, the OTP is contributing to the interpretational confusion of article 12(3) by even accepting to discuss the issue. The 3 questions are as follows:

1. Does the PA have the capacity to enter into international agreements?

2. Does the PA have the capacity to try Palestinians on criminal charges?

3. Does the PA have the capacity to try Israeli citizens on criminal charges?

I won’t go into a detailed consideration about these three questions and the argumentation put forward by Al Haq. More generally, I don’t see how these considerations are relevant.to the application of 12(3). 12(3) only refers to the exercise of 12(2) (blatantly absent from the Policy Paper!!!) which gives the two following jurisdictional criteria:

“the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:

(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft;

(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.”

 12(3) doesn’t exist in a void and has to be read in conjunction with 12(2). Therefore, accepting that the PA is a State under 12(3) is also recognizing that it is State under 12(2) which refers to two very traditional attributes of the State: territory and nationality. Presumably, the PA is not giving its “authorisation” for 12(2)(b), given that the alleged perpetrators will be Israeli, so 12(3) must apply in this case to 12(2)(a), thus indirectly accepting that the PA is a State with some territorial sovereignty. Pretty close to Statehood in the traditional sense.
Outside this consideration, the 3 questions posed are broadly irrelevant. The first one is, if one accepts the Policy Paper’s interpretation of 12(3). If the PA is not a State, it must still have the capacity to enter into a cooperation agreement with the ICC. But the other two are not. The criminal jurisdiction over the crimes is not helpful to apply 12(3). As the Policy Paper itself argues, most international crimes carry a certain obligation to exercise universal jurisdiction. Does it mean that any country in the world that passes a law allowing to prosecute Palestinians and Israelis can make a declaration under 12(3) about gaza? it doesn’t make sense. Again, the two considerations for 12(3) are those contained in 12(2): nationality and territory.

Why the confusion?
Why have these criteria been considered at all, including by the OTP? This is a totally uninformed guess, but I think there might be confusion as to the extent of 12(3). As I said before, it is linked to 12(2) and the jurisdictional links that circumscribe ICC jurisdiction. But 12(3) is not an additional trigger mechanism. There are only three: referral by a State Party, the Security Council and the exercise of proprio motu powers by the Prosecutor (are people actually still holding their breath on that one?). The conditions put forward by the OTP and the Policy Paper are better fit to the triggering of a case or the admissibility of the case, not the existence of the territorial and national jurisdiction over the case, which is what 12(2) and 12(3) are concerned with. Even if the declaration were to be accepted, it would still be required that a State or the Security Council refer the situation, or that the prosecutor seize himself of the situation.

Conclusion
This is once again a case of mass delusion in my opinion, of wanting the Statute to say something it doesn’t and therefore pretending that it does. The challenges of combating international crimes must be met, but not at the cost of legal certainty. Now that I think about it, the Policy Paper is wrong in saying that the Statute does not provide for situations like this, thus allowing alleged crimes go unpunished. The Security Council, as the Paper mentions, can refer any situation with a lot of discretion, irrespective of the status of the territory or the nationality of the alleged perpetrators. Of course, the US will never allow a case involving Israel to be referred to the ICC, but this reveals a problem with the Security Council, where the fight should be taken, not the ICC Statute, which, as a treaty is bound by a fundamental rule of international law, that an agreement binds only those who consented to it. Of all people, Human Rights activists should agree with this concept of liberty that you can’t impose something on someone against his will…