Category Archives: ICC

First Judgment at the ICC: Some Random Thoughts on the Lubanga Verdict (part 2): the investigation

Moving away from questions of form, as dealt with in my previous post, let’s look at certain issues of substance, which I will broadly consider in the order they are dealt with in the judgment. Because I want to keep my posts short(ish), I will comment in over different posts…
  • … but first, another comment on form and style
Having plowed through nearly 300 pages of the Judgment so far, there are already a number of parts that could have been seriously cut down. What is the point, for example, of recalling the case law on victim participation at the beginning? The same is true of the factual overview. International Judgments are not history books, and should not try to be history books. For one, they often get things wrong. More importantly, that is not their function. This overview should only be mentioned if it is relevant for the legal analysis (for the determination of the nature of the armed conflict, for example (more on this in Part 3)). 
On the related question of style, international judges have to stop acting as if they are giving a lecture to, depending on the section of the judgment, students/activists/fellow professionals/academics. They are Judges and are not meant and should not be expected to engage in academic debates unnecessarily. Two examples in what I’ve read so far (but I’m sure there are more). 
When discussing the nature of the armed conflict (again, more on the substance of this in Part 3 of this blog series), the Chamber refers to academic and jurisprudential discussions on the relevancy of the distinction between an international and a non-international armed conflict (§539). It then says, however, that: 

In the view of the Chamber, for the purposes of the present trial the international/non-international distinction is not only an established part of the international law of armed conflict, but more importantly it is enshrined in the relevant statutory provisions of the Rome Statute framework, which under Article 21 must be applied. The Chamber does not have the power to reformulate the Court’s statutory framework.

Of course I agree with this statement, but it shows how far we’ve gone in misunderstanding the role of the international criminal judiciary that these judges would feel the need to mention it explicitly in the judgment! It is a self-evident truth that is in-built in the role of these individuals as judges and should not have to be recalled in such a context.
A second example relates to the definition of the crime that was charged. The Statute clearly mentions the crime and the age of 15. There’s no discussion in that respect. Why therefore does the Chamber feel the need to explain the historical reasons for this prohibition and the fact that “children are particularly vulnerable” (§605-606)? This is neither a course in the history of international crimes nor a course in sociology and such discussions have no place in a Judgment. And the counter-argument of pedagogy, once again, is lost in my opinion, when these 2 pages are drowned in the 600 pages of the judgment as a whole.

  • The Investigation Process generally

The Judgment details at length the investigative process of the OTP (starting at §124). This part of the judgment covers a number of issues relating to the investigation, notably the difficulty in gathering evidence and the security issues that were faced by the investigators. The Court highlights the fact that the team was composed of a number of former NGO personnel, as well as people from International justice and human rights (§126). Interestingly, the Court relays the testimony of one witness questioning NGO reports. The following quote from William Pace reproduced at §130 is quite telling in that respect:

Investigators also sometimes find it difficult to corroborate information provided by human rights groups who are eager to call international attention to crises. The gap between the assessment of the human rights groups and the evidence was sort of a surprise,” says Mr Lavigne, a French magistrate and former police detective, who heads the Congo investigation team. Mr Pace considered that “human rights and humanitarian organizations are lousy criminal investigators. They are not producing forensic evidence that can be used by a prosecutor.

This finds an echo in the recent Mbarushimana confirmation of charges decision, where the Prosecutor was criticised for relying too much on NGO reports. It more generally raises the issue of the professional conflation that exists between the various “communities” of international justice, where people easily switch from one activity to the other (academia, tribunals, activism) and more problematic even, often act in all these capacities at once, sometimes abusing their professional function to promote an activist agenda. Such conflation can also be seen in the style of the judgment (see above), with certain parts reading more like a lecture to LLM students than a judicial decision.

The Judgment also highlights the “inconsistent requests” that were made to the investigators due to the absence of clear guidelines and changes in investigative choices from the OTP (§144).

  • The use of intermediaries in particular

The major question that arose in relation to the investigation was the use of certain intermediaries by the Prosecutor and their alleged misconduct. This had led to a series of decisions in the course of the trial (see here and here) where prosecutorial actions were severely criticized, even leading to a stay of proceedings.

The Trial Chamber revisits this issue in the Judgment. In fact, it takes up 130 pages (more than a fifth of the judgment!). It considers the background to the use of intermediaries and considers the credibility of the evidence that was gathered by a number of them, concluding in a number of instances that the evidence is not reliable due to the lack of professionalism or even dishonesty of certain intermediaries.

In the summary of the judgment, the judges issued a strong condemnation of the Prosecutor’s actions:

17.An issue that occupied the Chamber for a significant part of this trial concerned the use by the prosecution of local intermediaries in the DRC. The Chamber is of the view that the prosecution should not have delegated its investigative responsibilities to the intermediaries as analysed in the judgment, notwithstanding the extensive security difficulties that it faced. A series of witnesses have been called during this trial whose evidence, as a result of the essentially unsupervised actions of three of the principal intermediaries, cannot safely be relied on.

18.The Chamber spent a considerable period of time investigating the circumstances of a substantial number of individuals whose evidence was, at least in part, inaccurate or dishonest. The prosecution’s negligence in failing to verify and scrutinise this material sufficiently before it was introduced led to significant expenditure on the part of the Court. An additional consequence of the lack of proper oversight of the intermediaries is that they were potentially able to take advantage of the witnesses they contacted. Irrespective of the Chamber’s conclusions regarding the credibility and reliability of the alleged former child soldier witnesses, given their youth and likely exposure to conflict, they were vulnerable to manipulation.

This is all very nice, but the childish glee one gets from seeing the Prosecutor criticized once again has now lost its appeal through toothless repetition and been replaced with the frustration of nothing coming out of it. In particular, I don’t share Kevin’s enthusiasm, over at Opinio Juris, that this shows the judges “listened” to the Defense. Big deal. Time and again, in this instance as in a number of other occasions, the Prosecutor has received harsh rebukes from the Chambers in relation to such futile issues of his public statements, to more important issues relating to his investigations as well as egregious cases such as this one where, not only the Prosecutor showed, at best, gross negligence in his choice of intermediaries, but actually refused to comply with clear orders from the Court to release their names. A slap on the wrist is no longer sufficient. There exist tools in the Statute, such as Articles 70 and 71 that allow for the sanction of the Prosecutor for this kind of conduct and it is about time that they are used.

Moreover, back on the length of the judgment, I’m not quite sure, in light of this unfolding intermediary fiasco, why this was not dealt with months ago. If one of these people was entirely untrustworthy, it should have been considered when the whole issue arose and the stay of proceedings was decided. 20% of the final judgment on this issue is ridiculous.

All in all, this part of the judgment shows the difficulties of investigating such crimes in such circumstances. It also dramatically identifies the failures of the OTP, even in such circumstances. There is clearly a pattern here, when you add the two decisions declining to confirm charges that have occurred. People tend to blame the outgoing prosecutor for these failings. For me, as I’ve said before, the jury is still out and I am not willing to give an automatic blank check to the new Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, whatever appreciation I might have of her as an individual. Indeed, I have difficulty believing that such systemic and repeated errors are the sole responsibility of one man. I hope I am proven wrong on this.

(to be continued, stay tuned)

First Judgment at the ICC: Some Random Thoughts on the Lubanga Verdict (part 1)

(see Part 2 and Part 3)

Today, the ICC issued its first judgment in the Lubanga trial. He was found guilty of the war crime of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 and using them to participate in hostilities. There are a number of things to write about it, and I’ll do so over the coming days, time allowing.

Before going into the substance of some of the issues considered, a few words on the conduct of the trial. There is no doubt that any ambition to have this trial as a sort of model trial, just as you have model houses that you can visit, evaporated long ago. This was meant to be a simple case.The Prosecutor decided to have a lengthy list of charges, a criticism often levelled at the prosecutiorial strategy at the ad hoc tribunals and essentially charged Lubanga with one crime relating to child soldiers. This should have been an easy case. However, as we all know, due to a combination of delays (prosecutorial misconduct, judicial activism on the requalification of charges, victim participation), the trial took way longer and went far less smoothly than expected.

This is the summary of the trial proceedings on the ICC website:

Over the course of 204 days of hearings, the Trial Chamber has delivered 275 written decisions and orders and 347 oral decisions. The Chamber heard 36 witnesses, including 3 experts, called by the Office of the Prosecutor, 24 witnesses called by the defence and 3 witnesses called by the legal representatives of the victims participating in the proceedings. The Chamber also called 4 experts. A total of 129 victims, represented by two teams of legal representatives and the Office of Public Counsel for Victims, were granted the right to participate in the trial. They have been authorised to present submissions and to examine witnesses on specific issues. The Prosecution submitted 368 items of evidence, the Defence 992, and the legal representatives of victims 13.

In comparison, in the Popovic et al. case at the ICTY, a case with 7 accused with counts including Genocide, Crimes against humanity and war crimes, 182 prosecution witnesses, around 130 defense witnesses several thousand exhibits, there were 425 trials days, a little more than twice the Lubanga trial.

The comparison need not stop here. The Popovic Judgment, again for 7 acussed and all the related evidence, is two volumes long and some 900 pages. The Lubanga Judgment, including the separate opinions is over 600 pages. For one accused, and essentially one count! One can only have nightmares at the thought of having to read the judgment in the Katanga and Chui case, with two accused and some 10 counts, or an hypothetical Bashir Judgment with its long list of charges… Something needs to be done about this judicial logorrhea. What is amazing is that I’ve heard some of the staff of these tribunals justify the length of judgments for reasons of pedagogy. Of course. It makes total sense that a layperson is more likely to read a 600 page judgment than a 200 page judgment…

And while we’re on form rather than substance, I just came accross the first press release from the OTP following the judgment. It welcomed the first verdict of the Court, of course. It says nothing of the fact that the OTP was publicly chastised for its negligence and sloppiness in the gathering of evidence and use of intermediaries, of course (more on this in subsequent posts). But what it mostly does is celebrate the fact that Angelina Jolie attended the hearing! The first trial at the ICC, the first Judgment, the first conviction, the recognition of the criminal activity of Lubanga and his armed group for thousands of victims, the controversy about not charging sexual crimes, the upcoming sentencing proceedings… and the angle that the OTP chooses for this first press release is the presence of Angelina Jolie… a watershed moment indeed…

Some thoughts on what happened at the ASP of the ICC: change the policies before discussing people or budget

The Assembly of State Parties just finished its 10th session in New York. The high point of this session was the selection of the next ICC Prosecutor, to replace Luis Moreno Ocampo, and the winner, unsurprisingly, was Fatou Besouda, the current Deputy Prosecutor. Another issue was the election of new judges and determination of the 2012 budget. At the end of this session, I wanted to share a few thoughts.

On the choice of Fatou Bensouda as prosecutor, I broadly share the enthusiasm of a number of commentators, such as Kevin Heller over at Opinio Juris, Mark Kersten at Justice in Conflict or Bill Schabas. In the few times I have met her, she has come across as thoughtful and pleasant, and seems to have a decidedly less “gritty” style than her soon-to-be-predecessor.
But I do have some lingering concerns. As I said when her name started floating around (see comments section here), I don’t think we can just brush under the carpet the fact that she has worked with Luis Moreno Ocampo for the past 8 years. He is certainly personally to blame for a number of errors of the OTP, most notably in terms of communication, but I cannot believe that he is alone responsible for all the blunders of his office. Under his mandate, 2 cases have not been confirmed by a Pre-Trial Chamber (Abu Garda, and more recently Mbarushimana) and the conduct of the OTP in the Lubanga trial should have led to the suspect’s release in a number of situations and possibly the removal or at least sanction of the prosecutor. I can’t imagine that Ocampo did not have some support from his office, including Bensouda, for a number of these disasters. In this sense, I’m not sure that continuity is such a good thing.
More generally, I’m not entirely convinced that the general rhetoric of having an African Prosecutor is convincing. I don’t see how the criticism of the ICC being an “African Court to Prosecute Africans” is addressed by the designation of Bensouda. This will just be an “African Court to Prosecute Africans by an African”… The real issue is not the nationality of the Prosecutor, it is the policies that are implemented. In this sense I perfectly agree with Bill Schabas, that the nomination of Bensouda can only go so far to mend the perceptions of the Court. Only a change in policy will make any real change in perceptions.

I also wanted to share a few thoughts in relation to the public outcry on the only marginal increase of the budget of the Court. These concerns are relayed here by Mark Kersten.
On the face of it, the 117 million euro budget that was requested by the Court does not seem unreasonable for a permanent international criminal tribunal that is currently involved in 7 countries, with a number of others on the waiting list. As a comparison, this is about the recent yearly budget of the ICTY, involved in only one country, and which is winding down its activities. Certainly, the CICC and Mark are right to express doubts at whether the Court will be able to perform in the future if the increase in activity is not followed by an increase in budget.
But this legitimate question must not prevent us from questioning the way the money is spent. There are some rather futile examples of misspending, such as a full page ad in the Economist. Equally, one could bicker about the salaries that are paid at the Court, which sometimes seem extravagant, especially to the humble university Professor that I am. But more fundamental questions should be raised in terms of priorities and mistakes. How much did the Mbarushimana and Abu Garda investigations cost, for such a poor result? How much has the poorly designed (and made worse by the judges) victim participation system cost the court in money and in time (and therefore in money)? Also, the Court complains that the UNSC is referring situations without contributing to the budget. I have a solution for that. Don’t take referrals from the UNSC anymore. For one, they are in some respect contrary to international law, but more pragmatically, doesn’t the Court have enough on its plate with State Parties, without delving into the affairs of non-State Parties? These are just a few policy considerations that need to be addressed in order to have a full and comprehensive discussion on the budget.

On a final note, I couldn’t help but react at Mark’s conclusion:

In the end, there is a grave danger that money determines who receives justice and who doesn’t; that funding defines the quality and extent of justice served. It would be a sad world to live in and one in which international criminal justice’s skeptics and cynics win.

I don’t know in what world my esteemed colleague has indeed been living in to make such a statement, but in the one I live in, this is already the case, and not just at international tribunals. We live in a worlds of limited means and ressources and there is always a limited budget for any institution, both nationally and internationally, and, in other words, never enough money. I think that one can say that without being labelled as a “cynic” or “skeptic”. That’s just the nature of things. More specifically, all the national examples of criminal systems are suffering from too many cases, where the exercise of discretion is necessarily also based on the question of limited means, and where release decisions from prison are for example based on them being too full, rather than on criminological reasons. And one criteria to discriminate one case from another, is gravity, which is either ignored or misapplied at the ICC. Again, for me, neither Lubanga (at least for these charges), nor Abu Garda, should have been prosecuted before the Court, irrespective of money.

In this sense, I would conclude in the same way as for the nomination of Fatou Bensouda: change the policies, in order to change anything. One can pour in as much money as one wants in the institution, if the policies are unsound, it won’t make a difference to the objectives of justice of the Court.

Self Promotion: Who is in charge of the charges at the ICC?

I’ve just published on SSRN the draft of my upcoming chapter in the THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (William A. Schabas, Niamh Hayes, Yvonne McDermott and Maria Varaki, eds.).  In it, I consider the powers of the various organs of the ICC in defining, amending and recharacterizing the charges, especially the infamous Regulation 55 which was at the heart of the controversy surrounding the attempt by the Trial Chamber in Lubanga to introduce new charges of sexual violence during the trial and which I commented on here and here.


Here is the abstract:

One issue that has come to the fore in the early practice of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is the question of who determines the content of the charges against an accused individual and the scope and timing of any amendments that are to be made. The importance of this issue is threefold. First, having a clear framework for the amendment of charges is important from the point of view of the accused. If he or she is to have adequate time for the preparation of the defence, it is important that there be some certainty as to the charges resting against him or her, without running the risk of multiple amendments. Second, the issues are illustrative of the more general concern in the ICC Statute to achieve a balance between legal certainty and judicial efficiency. The former requires that as few amendments as possible be allowed the more advanced the proceedings are, whereas the latter opens to door to some flexibility to avoid acquittals based on a faulty determination of the charges. Third, as will be illustrated in the course of the chapter, it more generally highlights the difficult balance of power to be struck between various organs of the Court, not just between the Prosecutor and the Chambers, but also between the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber, and begs the question as to whether the judges of the ICC ought to have the final say in matters that might seem to relate more to a legislative rather than judicial function.

Please don’t hesitate to circulate, and all comments are welcome!

A Sad Hommage to Antonio Cassese: The ICC’s confused pronouncements on State Compliance and Head of State Immunity

This week, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court has been busy reprimanding African States for non-cooperation in executing the Arrest Warrant against Sudan President, Omar Al Bashir. On Monday it issued a decision on the failure of Malawi to comply and yesterday, a similar decision was issued in relation to Chad (decision in French).

This could have been a fairly innocuous event. In the past 18 months, the PTC has on several occasions taken notice of the presence of Bashir in an African country (Tchad and Kenya in August 2010, Djibouti in May 2011). Each time, in short decisions, the judges found that these countries had not complied with their obligation under the statute as State parties to enforce the arrest warrant against the Sudanese president. So the two decisions this week would seem to fall in line with these previous findings, a normal day at the office so to speak.
Of course, the question still remains whether State parties are 1) actually under an automatic obligation under the Statute to execute an arrest warrant and 2) whether the general requests for the arrest and surrender of Bashir to all States that the Pre-Trial Chamber issued in 2009 and 2010 (respectively here and here) are actually in conformity with the Statute. I have already argued that the answer is negative on both counts because Article 89(1) provides that you need a request from the Court to have an obligation under the Statute and that, for the sentence “…any State on the territory of which that person may be found” (as opposed to just “any State”) to make any sense, the request must be specific and specifically justified, rather than be general and preemptive. This is confirmed by the very specific information that must be provided with the request under Article 91.
But again, the two recent decisions would generally be old news already if they had followed the exact same approach as previous ones.

However, the Pre-Trial Chamber has decided to be bolder this time and address the question of head of State immunities, both under Article 27(2) of the Statute and in relation to Article 98(1) of the Statute, and the articulation between the two. The reasoning of the Chamber is so confused and unsatisfactory that it is difficult to know where to start.

Before I move to the heart of the discussion, I wanted to point a minor procedural issue, but that is illustrative of the general sloppiness of the drafting. When a Chamber makes a finding of non-compliance with a request for cooperation under Article 87(7), Regulation 109 of the Regulations of the Court (drafted by the Judges themselves) provides that the President shall refer the matter to the ASP or the UNSC. However, the Malawi decision ignores this and orders that the Registrar transmit the decision. This is all the more surprising, that the Chad decision (in French) actually uses the correct procedure and explicitly refers to Regulation 109 to ask the president to transmit the decision. This inconsistency comes up, despite the bench being composed of the same judges. Apparently, the francophone Assistant Legal Advisers at the Court are more knowledgeable than the anglophone ones…

But let’s now come to the question of Articles 27 and 98(1), relating to head of State immunities.

  • The discussion of Article 27

First of all, the judges consider the issue of Immunity of Heads of States in International Proceedings (§§22-36 of the Malawi decision. In the remainder of the post, I will refer to this decision, which is broadly reproduced in the Chad one).
Going back as far as 1919, the PTC refers to a string of international judgments (Nuremberg, Tokyo, ICTY and even ICJ), statutes of international tribunals (ICTY, ICTR, SCSL) and other documents (Principles of International Law recognised in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind) to conclude that (§36):

“Therefore, the Chamber finds that the principle in international law is that immunity of either former or sitting Heads of State can not be invoked to oppose a prosecution by an international court. This is equally applicable to former or sitting Heads of States not Parties to the Statute whenever the Court may exercise jurisdiction.”

 The Chamber seems to think that the sheer number of references will make their argument compelling. But this is a typical judicial application of the “cheerleader effect“: all the references look good together, but taken separately might not be so convincing. Indeed, the references actually concern two distinct issues. The first one, which is dealt with in Article 27(1) of the ICC Statute, is whether official capacity can remove the criminal responsibility of a person. The second one, dealt with under Article 27(2) of the ICC Statute, is whether head of State immunity can prevent an international Court from exercising jurisdiction. There is no debate about the first question in the current case, only about the second one so the following references are just irrelevant: Statute of the IMT, Statute of the Tokyo Tribunal, UN Principles, Code of Crimes, ICTY Statute, ICTR Statute and SCSL Statute. Which leaves us with more or less one relevant source, which is the ICJ Arrest Warrants Case.

In any case, from a methodological point of view, it is puzzling why the Chamber actually engages in these developments. As is often the case in international criminal decisions, there is a very “flexible” approach to the sources of law. The PTC does not, at any point, justify why these references are even invoked. This is especially troubling at the ICC, because the drafters of the Rome Statute, contrary to those of others Statutes of international criminal tribunals, actually chose to include an explicit provision on the Applicable law, which clearly provides (Article 21(1)(a)) that the Statute, RPE and Elements of Crimes are the first documents to be considered. Article 27(2) clearly says that head of State immmunity “shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person”. There was no reason whatsoever to give a lecture in the history of international prosecutions to reach the conclusion that is already mandated by the Statute.

One could of course question whether applying 27(2) to the Heads of States of non-State parties is contrary to international law, but that is not the judges’ problem. I’ve argued elsewhere that the whole UNSC referral mechanism is somewhat contrary to international law. But once the case actually comes before a Chamber, the judges are bound by the Statute and should apply 27(2). Should this mean that the ICC, as an institution, would be violating international law is not the judge’s concern. Sudan should raise the question of the responsibility of the ICC, as an International organization, or even its member States, which would be a nice case of Shared Responsibility. But again, not an issue for the judges. In this sense I actually agree with the Tadic Trial Chamber, which refused to consider the legality of the creation of the ICTY. It was not its function to do so.
But I digress. In a nutshell, the PTC could have just referred to 27(2) and moved on (although the whole discussion on 27(2) is in my opinion irrelevant, but more on that later).

  • Articulation with 98(1)

Article 98(1)provides that:

“The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.”

 The Chamber considers that there is a tension between 27(2) and 98(1) (§37). To solve this tension, it further pushes its reasoning in relation to international prosecutions of heads of States. Stating that there has been an increase in Head of State prosecutions by international courts (citing Taylor, Gbagbo and Gaddafi), the PTC says that this has gained “widespread recognition as accepted practice” (§39). This practice is further illustrated by the ratification by 120 States to the Rome Statute (and therefore to article 27(2)) and by the fact that some Security Council members who have not joined the Court have agreed to refer situations to the Court. The judges therefore conclude, in what can only be described as “armchair legal reasoning”, that (§42):

“The  Chamber  considers  that  the  international  community’s  commitment to rejecting  immunity in  circumstances  where  international  courts seek  arrest for international crimes  has  reached a critical mass. If it ever was  appropriate to say so, it is certainly no longer appropriate to say that customary international law immunity applies in the present context.”

 There would certainly be a lot to say about the Chamber’s approach to determining the content of customary law, although it does at least refer to State practice, which is far less egregious than what the Special Tribunal for Lebanon did last year, when referring to the practice of international courts not contested by “States, non-state actors and other interested parties”, to determine the existence of a customary norm. The key point, however, is that the practice that is referred to, is only evidence of the potentially customary nature of Article 27(2). It does not, as the Court affirms, relate to the question of the arrest and surrender  of an accused.

In this sense, I believe that there is in fact no tension between 27(2) and 98(1), because these two provisions are not about the same thing! Article 27(2) relates to the jurisdiction of the Court itself and 98(1) to obligations of States in relation to other States in general international law. Moreover, if the drafters of the Rome Statute believed that the inclusion of Article 27(2) meant automatically that there was an obligation to cooperate with the ICC irrespective of head of State immunity of non-State parties, why include Article 98(1) at all? It would make no sense.

So clearly, the Court has in fact brought into the discussion Article 27(2), when it should have kept its discussion limited to 98(1). The only relevant reasoning that would have been acceptable was whether, given the phrasing of 98(1), there is a crystallizing rule under international law that head of State immunity does not carry in the national context, which would therefore remove the difficulty with 98(1). This would have involved a more serious discussion of the Arrest Warrant Case, and evolution since then. But again, this is sadly not what the Chamber did, instead rendering a muddled and inappropriate decision.

This is all the more inappropriate given the fact that the Chamber, in considering the obligations of Malawi, makes a key finding (even if it had been said before) on the application of Head of State immunity to a defendant in a procedure that is not designed for that, which raises questions in relation to the rights of the defense, given that the Office of the Public Counsel for the Defense does not seem to have been involved in the discussions and that this is not a decision which is subject to appeal under Article 82. In that respect, one can even question whether the term “decision” is appropriate for such a document. Indeed, Article 87(7) does not even seem to describe a formal procedure. It refers to “a finding” of non-compliance, rather than a “decision”, whereas the Statute uses the word “decision” in most of the Statute, and only uses the term “finding” twice, in relation to evidence, and in the context of Article 87(7). The French version, which says that the Court “peut prendre acte” of the non-compliance, leans even more to the less formal nature of the determination. As for the question of Regulation 109, this might seem like a detail, but it does contribute to the general impression of a less than precise job that is reflected in the heart of the discussion, as illustrated previously.

  • A sad hommage to Antonio Cassese?

The explicit reference to the late Antonio Cassese, not only in a footnote, but in the main text (§34), can only mean that this decision is seen as an hommage to one of the most active proponents of judicial creativity. But it is likely that the former President of the ICTY and STL, although he might agree with the final result, would himself cringe at the less than convincing legal reasoning of the Pre-Trial Chamber.

This Decision might be a testimony that his legacy of creativity lives on, but without his talent, judgments that were, despite the criticism that could be leveled at them, judicial symphonies, when crafted by him, sound like children randomly hitting the keys of an out-of-tune piano, when crafted by others.

UPDATE 1: For other critical assessments of the decisions, see Professor Schabas and Dapo Akande, who are both skeptical about the court’s reasoning.

UPDATE 2: in relation to Regulation 109, there has been a corrigendum to the original decision which correctly asks the President (and not the Registry) to refer the matter to the ASP and UNSC.